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ence during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document large causal
effects on trust and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of ethnic conflicts in 2002–2005.
We exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer (Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in
Uganda, 2000, 2008), including information on socioeconomic characteristics at the individ-
ual level, and geo-referenced measures of fighting events from ACLED. Our identification
strategy exploits variations in the both the spatial and ethnic intensity of fighting. We find that
more intense fighting decreases generalized trust and increases ethnic identity. The effects
are quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of
violence, and different statistical techniques involving ethnic and spatial fixed effects and
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of civil conflict on social capital, focusing on the expe-
rience of Uganda during the last decade. Civil conflicts have persistent devastating effects
on economic development (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2009), and their legacy
involves more than physical and human capital destruction. Civil conflicts often entail the
persistent breakdown of civic and economic cooperation within society. We are motivated
here by our recent theoretical work (Rohner et al. 2013), arguing that war leads to a collapse of
trust and social capital which in turn sows the seeds of more ethnic conflict. Yet, there are also
instances in which wars appear to cement rather than destroy cooperation. Historically, wars
promoted nation building in Europe (Tilly 1975). The aftermath of World War II in Western
Europe was characterized by strong institutional development involving social cooperation,
renewed national identity and sustained high economic growth (Eichengreen 2008). Interest-
ingly, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson (2013) find no evidence that warfare is associated with
future state building or political centralization in Africa. However, at a more micro level,
Bellows and Miguel (2009) report evidence of positive social capital developments in Sierra
Leone after the devastating civil conflict of 1991–2002.1 The goal of this paper is to address
two questions: First, is there evidence of causal effects of war on inter-ethnic trust? Second,
how do such effects differ across different dimensions of trust and social capital?
We document causal effects of ethnic conflict on trust and ethnic identity using individual,
county-level and district-level data from Uganda. An ethnic mosaic consisting of more than
50 groups, Uganda is a natural environment for such a micro-study. Ethnic conflicts have
been pervasive since independence in 1962. Since 1985, Uganda has been ruled by the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, whose main constituency
is the Bantu-dominated South. His government has faced opposition and armed rebellion in
several parts of the country, especially in the “Acholiland” region (in North Uganda), where
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was active until 2006, and close to the border with the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where the insurgency led by the Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF) was been active until 2004.
Our empirical strategy exploits an exogenous change in the policy against internal insur-
gency that occurred in 2001, after the September 11 terrorist attack. The declaration of
the “war on terror” was a turning point. In earlier years, the international community had
tried to promote negotiated settlements of the Ugandan conflicts.2 In 2001, the US Patriot
Act declared the LRA and the ADF terrorist organizations. Fearing retaliation, the ruling
Sudanese National Islamic Front that had offered sanctuary and military help to the LRA
until then, withdrew its support to the rebel army. Museveni’s government seized this oppor-
tunity to launch a military crackdown on rebel armies in different fronts, particularly in
the regions neighboring Sudan where the LRA had lost the logistic support from its basis
in Sudanese territory. The ADF was soon annihilated and ceased any significant military
activity within Uganda after 2004. Military action against the LRA started in March 2002,
when the army launched “Operation Iron Fist” against the rebel bases in South Sudan. The
LRA responded by attacking villages and government forces in Northern Uganda. Military
activity and reprisals peaked in 2003. In 2005, the LRA moved its bases to the Democratic
1 Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey to analyze whether people who have been victimized in
the civil war in Sierra Leone are affected in their post-war behavior. In particular, they find that more victimized
people are more likely to “attend community meetings”, and to “join social and political groups”.
2 An example of this strategy is the Amnesty Act of 2000, by which the Government of Uganda granted
amnesty to all rebels who would abandon violence, renouncing to criminal prosecution or punishment for
offenses related to the insurgency.
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Fig. 1 The figure shows the annual number of fighting events (left-hand scale) and the number of fatalites
(right-hand scale) in Uganda during 1997–2010. Source. ACLED (2011)
Republic of Congo, while the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for its
leader Joseph Kony. A cease-fire between the LRA and the government of Uganda was signed
on September 2006, with the mediation of the autonomous government of South Sudan.
Figure 1 shows the total number of geo-referenced fighting events and of fatalities related to
the conflict between 1997 and 2010 from Armed Conflicts Location Events Data (ACLED).
Between 2000 and 2008 ACLED reports nearly 2,500 fighting events resulting in almost
10,000 fatalities. Consistent with the narrative above, there was a sharp increase in 2002–
2005, followed by a decline, and very low levels of violence have been recorded after 2006.
The escalation of violence in 2002–2005 is not merely an Acholi phenomenon. A large
number of conflict episodes was recorded all over Uganda in this period (see Fig. 2).
We are interested in assessing the effects of this surge in violence on different measures of
trust and ethnic identity. To do so, we exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer
(2000, 2008), a repeated cross section including information on various measures of trust and
socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level.3 Our strategy is to regress individual
trust in year 2008 on spatial measures of intensity of fighting during 2000–2008, control-
ling for a large number of individual, ethnic and spatial characteristics. Most important, we
control for the average trust at the district level in 2000, in order to filter out cross-district
heterogeneity resulting from long-standing factors.4
3 Although Afrobarometer also ran a survey in 2005, we decided to use the 2008 data for a variety of reasons.
First, the number of conflicts was still large in 2005 (see Fig. 1). Second, we are interested in persistent effects
of conflict on trust rather than in emotional reactions that may arise while the conflict is still ongoing. Last
but not least important, there were still many refugees in 2005. This raises two issues. On the one hand, poor
living conditions in refugee camps may affect trust reported by respondents. On the other hand, many people
could be living in camps outside of their counties, rendering our identification strategy invalid.
4 The district of the respondent is the most disaggregated geographical information provided by the 2000
Afrobarometer.
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Fig. 2 The figure shows the districts and counties of Uganda and the location of fighting events. The bold
black lines display the district borders whose names are also listed in the map. The thin grey lines show
the county borders. The circles correspond to the locations of fighting events between 2000 and 2008 (from
ACLED 2011)
We address concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables through two comple-
mentary strategies. First, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy. Our identification relies
on an external political shock—i.e., the US declaring the main rebel movements of Uganda
to be terrorist organizations, and the Khartoum government withdrawing support of those
groups—affecting the intensity of fighting, but having no direct effect on trust measures.
Since political shock affected the probability of fighting differentially across geographical
areas, with a larger escalation of violence being observed close to the Sudanese border, we
use the distance of each county from Sudan as an instrument for the number of fighting
events.5
5 Although this instrument is time invariant, our identification relies on the fact that such geographical
characteristics affected the intensity of fighting after the September 11, 2001 shock. So, in a sense, our
instrument captures an interaction between the political shock and the geographic characteristic.
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We also consider an alternative strategy where the identification relies on the within-county
variation in conflict intensity involving different ethnic groups. ACLED provides information
about the rebel groups and ethnic militias that were involved in each conflict event. In most
cases, these groups can be linked to ethnic affiliations. We can then regress our measures of
trust on the number of fighting events involving different ethnic groups within each county,
controlling for both county and ethnic group fixed effects. Our hypothesis is that respondents
should be affected particularly by local events involving their own ethnic group.
Our main finding is that the intensity of fighting has a negative and statistically significant
effect on “trust towards other people from Uganda”. The estimated effect is quantitatively
large, and robust to instrumenting fighting intensity by distance to Sudan. A one-standard-
deviation increase in fighting (corresponding to 45 additional episodes of violence) translates
into a 46 % standard deviation decrease in trust (corresponding to 22 percentage points). This
is a very large effect, corresponding to about half of the difference between the Netherlands,
the eighth most trusting country in the world, and the three countries with the lowest trust
levels (Peru, Brazil and the Philippines).
The effect is stronger when fighting events involve the respondent’s ethnic group. Fighting
has no significant effects on “trust in known people” and on “trust in relatives”, suggesting
that fighting induces distrust mainly towards people outside the ordinary social network.
Moreover, people living in counties experiencing more fighting report a large increase in a
self-reported measure of “ethnic identity”, i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with
their own ethnic group relative to other forms of affiliation, including Ugandan nationality.
This result is robust to the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects. The response is stronger for
people owning a radio, who are likely to be better informed about events associated with the
conflict. Moreover, the results are not driven by the Acholi region, the most tormented by
the conflict between the LRA and the government. Excluding all counties of core Acholiland
does not affect the estimates.
In Rohner et al. (2013), we argue that by undermining trust, conflict hinders economic
cohesion in ethnically divided societies. Although a thorough empirical investigation of this
question would require a longer time span of data, in an extension we consider the economic
effects of ethnic conflicts. Ideally, one would like to study how the dynamics of GDP per capita
at the county level are affected by exposure to conflict. However, regional GDP data are not
available for Uganda. We resort to proxying these with the average intensity of nighttime light
recorded by U.S. meteorological satellites at the county level. We document an interesting
interaction effect: given the intensity of fighting, post-conflict economic recovery depends
on the ethnic fractionalization of each county. Fighting has a negative effect on the economic
situation of highly fractionalized counties 4 years after the end of the conflict outburst, but
has no effect on less fractionalized counties.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is part of a large literature on inter-ethnic conflict. Earlier contributions focus on
characteristics of the political process (see, e.g., Horowitz 2000), while more recent formal
theories study the effect of population characteristics (see, e.g., Esteban and Ray 2011;
Rohner 2011). Different from these papers, our study suggests that ethnic identity may be
endogenous relative to the conflict dynamics.6
6 In this sense our paper is related to a recent literature studying endogenous ethnic and political identity
in various contexts (see Balcells 2012; Caselli and Coleman 2013; Choi and Bowles 2007; Fryer and Levitt
2004; Posner 2004).
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While we examine the effect of conflict on social capital, over the last decade a large
empirical literature has studied the opposite channel, i.e., how different measures of ethnic
diversity predict the outbreak of civil wars.7 However, there is also a growing number of
micro-level studies dealing with the impact of conflicts on human capital, in particular the
educational attainment of cohorts exposed to war, in different countries (see Akresh and de
Walque 2010; Blattman and Annan 2010; Leon 2012; Shemyakina 2011; Swee 2008). There is
also a literature in medicine documenting that child soldiers or children who experienced war
are more likely to experience depression and post-traumatic stress or anxiety (see Barenbaum
et al. 2004; Dyregrov et al. 2000, and Derluyn et al. 2004).
The studies above focus on human rather than social capital. More directly related to
our work is the recent literature on the effect of individual war experience on political par-
ticipation and local collective action (see, e.g., Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009,
and Humphreys and Weinstein 2007). Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) study the histor-
ical legacy of pre-colonial conflict in Africa and find that historical conflict is negatively
correlated with trust levels today.
There is also a conflict-related literature based on lab and field experiments, includ-
ing Fearon et al. (2009), Gilligan et al. (2010), Miguel et al. (2011), Voors et al. (2012),
and Whitt and Rick (2007). Cassar et al. (2013) run experiments in Tajikistan and
find that conflict exposure reduces trusting and fair behavior, especially in interactions
with people from the same area. They explain this finding as due to the nature of the
Tajik war, in which clear frontlines were absent and much violence took place within
villages.
Our paper is related also to the literature linking trust and social capital in commu-
nities to past history and ethnic fragmentation.8 While Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)
finds that participation in social activities is lower in ethnically heterogeneous commu-
nities, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) shows that a recent history of traumatic experi-
ences and discrimination, poverty, low education and ethnic diversity correlate with low
trust. Ashraf and Oded (2011) and Ashraf and Galor (2013) link cultural diversity of
societies to their long-run development. They find that genetic diversity has a hump-
shaped effect on comparative economic development: on the one hand diversity results in
more distrust, lower coordination, less cooperation and more social unrest; on the other
hand, a wider spectrum of traits makes is easier to implement advanced technological
paradigms.
Using Afrobarometer and historical data, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that indi-
viduals in sub-Saharan African countries whose ancestors belonged to ethnicities that were
subject to a high intensity of enslavement report lower trust levels today. Our results are
complementary to theirs. While they emphasize persistent effects of events that occurred
long time ago, we show that large contemporaneous shocks can change beliefs and social
capital. In a similar vein, Guiso et al. (2009) document that bilateral trust across countries
depends on the number of years in which the two countries have been in war during the
last millennium. Different aspects of the relationship between trust and growth are studied
by Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009). A number of papers
document that business links are more stable between people of the same ethnic groups
(Fafchamps 2000; Fisman 2003). These papers are related to the findings in our paper
7 See Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier and Rohner (2008), Collier et al. (2009),
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban et al. (2012).
8 For a general discussion of the origins and effects of trust and social capital on economic development, see
the survey articles of Doepke and Zilibotti (2013), Fehr (2009), Guiso et al. (2006), and Sobel (2002).
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that fighting appears to have larger post-war economic effects in ethnically fractionalized
counties.
Finally, our paper is related to the limited literature on the consequences of the conflict
in Uganda. Bozzoli et al. (2011) analyzes the effect of conflict on individual expectations
in Northern Uganda. Their paper is complementary to ours insofar as it documents the
effect of differential exposure to conflict. However, they use a different dataset (the Northern
Uganda Livelihood Survey) which covers only the population living in six Northern districts.
This survey is only available for 2007, so pre-conflict attitudes cannot be controlled for.
Using also data from Northern Uganda, Fiala (2013) analyses the economic consequences of
being internally displaced. A recent paper by De Luca and Verpoorten (2011)—carried out
independently, and posterior to the first version of our paper—studies the effect of conflict
in Uganda on associational membership and trust.9 Deininger (2003) analyzes household
survey data for Uganda and finds that households more heavily affected by civil strife are
less likely to engage in (non-farm) enterprise expansion or startup and are more likely to close
down an existing enterprise. Vargas Hill et al. (2008) document that in Uganda agricultural
“cooperatives were much less likely (…) to exist in communities that had recently experienced
civil conflict”.
Section 2 provides an overview of the historical context of the Ugandan conflict. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the main empirical
results regarding the effect of conflict on measures of trust and ethnic identity. Section 5
performs some robustness checks. Section 6 analyzes two important extensions focusing,
respectively, on spatial×ethnic variation in violence, and the economic effects of ethnic con-
flict. Section 7 concludes. A number of additional statistics and robustness tests and a detailed
data description are found in the Appendix.
2 Context of conflict in Uganda
Since pre-colonial times the area of what is Uganda today has been characterized by
a great ethnic diversity. The main dividing line runs between the Nilotic people of the
North, and the Bantu-dominated South. These ethnic identities were fostered by the British
colonization as part of a divide-and-rule strategy. For instance, the colonial adminis-
tration restricted inter-ethnic movements. While Nilotic ethnic groups (and in particu-
lar the Acholi) were over-represented in the army, they were under-represented in the
administration and white-collar jobs, and generally discriminated against (Nannyonjo
2005).
Even after independence in 1962, Ugandan politics remained dominated by ethnicity,
with each leader favored some groups, and repressed others. Uganda’s first prime min-
ister, Milton Obote, was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971, whose regime was hostile
to Acholi soldiers, perceived to be Obote’s agents. After Amin, it was again the turn
of Obote to rule the country, who was followed by Acholi officer Tito Okello. During
this period, the dominant position of northerners in the army was re-established, only to
be dismantled again when Okello lost power in 1986 to the former rebel leader of the
National Resistance Army (NRA) and current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni,
a southerner (Finnström 2008). The northern (and in particular, Acholi) ex-officers and
9 This study uses a different econometric specification that does not control for past trust (which play a key
role in our identification), nor does it consider ethnic identity. It is based on Afrobarometer 2005, whereas
we prefer to use Afrobarometer (2008) for reasons explained in detail below. Finally it emphasizes different
outcome variables, and does not link fighting events to specific ethnic groups.
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soldiers of the Ugandan army fell again from grace, and have since played an impor-
tant role in the various Northern-based rebel movements. In 1987 Joseph Kony started
his own militia drafting mostly Acholi deserters. This movement eventually became, in
1994, the most important and persistent rebel movement of Uganda, under the name of
LRA.
Although over time the LRA has intensified criminal activities and often attacked vil-
lages inhabited by people from their own ethnic background—either to prosecute alleged
traitors, or to force the recruitment of child soldiers—the conflict has ethnic roots.10 Accord-
ing to Nannyonjo (2005, p. 475), “the current conflict in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions
between the LRA and the Ugandan government has deep historical roots resulting from
ethnic hostilities…”. This view is echoed by Finnström (2008, pp. 74–75), “the major-
ity of people in central Uganda perceived Museveni’s war as a war against a regime of
northerners, rather than the war for democracy. (…) In Museveni’s war propaganda, the
enemy was alleged to be northerners in general and Acholi in particular”. Similarly, the
Women’s Commission (2001, p. 81) argues that “the current conflict in northern Uganda
has its roots in ethnic mistrust between the Acholi people and the ethnic groups of cen-
tral and southern Uganda as well as in the religious and spiritual beliefs of the Acholi
people and the manipulation of these beliefs.” The civil population in the North suf-
fered abuses from both the LRA and the government troops (Dolan 2009).11 Interest-
ingly, the primary blame and grievances kept being directed mostly against the Kam-
pala government and the southern Bantu-speaking ethnicities that it represents (Finnström
2008).
The role of Sudan is especially important. Since the early 1990s, the Khartoum government
had provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment, allowing it to hold base
camps in southern Sudan. In exchange, the LRA helped the Sudanese army to fight the south
Sudanese rebels. The Ugandan government, in turn, supported the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army. Reciprocal accusations led the two governments to sever diplomatic relationships
in 1995. In early 1999, former US President Jimmy Carter chaired negotiations to restore
these ties (see Neu 2002). Progress was slow until September 11, 2001, when the Sudanese
government came under heavy international pressure. In 2002 Uganda and Sudan restored
diplomatic relations and signed a protocol giving the Ugandan army the right to enter southern
Sudan and attack the LRA.
Besides this major violent conflict between the southern government and the north-
ern rebels of the LRA, in recent years there have been several other smaller-scale eth-
nic conflicts in Uganda. For example, the rebels of ADF have been fighting the gov-
ernment in southwestern Uganda, and there has been widespread ethnic violence in the
northeastern Karamoja region triggered by cattle raiding (Nannyonjo 2005; Finnström
2008).
10 According to Finnström (2008), the Museveni government has tried hard to frame the LRA as non-
politically motivated criminals who attack their own people. In particular, “the rhetoric of a local northern
conflict in which Acholi kill fellow Acholi like cannibalistic grasshoppers, reflects a more general Ugandan
conception of the Acholi as violent and war-prone” (Finnström 2008, p. 107).
11
“The conduct of the Museveni’s troops (…) soon deteriorated. Killings, rape, and other forms of physical
abuse aimed at noncombatants became the order of the day soon after the soldiers established themselves in
Acholiland, which was foreign territory for them” (Finnström 2008, p. 71).
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3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Data sources
Our main data source is the Afrobarometer (2008) survey on Uganda, in which 2431 subjects
were surveyed between July and October 2008, in 55 districts and 125 counties of Uganda.12
Each respondent is associated with a district and a county of residence, as well as with an
ethnic group. We also use information from Afrobarometer (2000). Note that the smallest
geographical unit included in the 2000 survey is the district. Thus, we can only construct our
control variables from this data source (particularly, past trust and living conditions) at the
district level.
The other major data source is the ACLED (Armed Conflict and Location and Event
Dataset 2011) dataset, which provides precise geo-location of various categories of fighting
events. In Afrobarometer, we ignore the precise geo-location of respondents. Using ArcGIS,
we consequently aggregate fighting events both at the county- and district-level and match
them with the county and district of residence of Afrobarometer respondents.
All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix, and the descriptive statistics
of all variables used are contained in Table 16 in the Appendix. We describe here the main
variables.
3.2 Main variables
3.2.1 Dependent variables
We use mainly two questions from Afrobarometer (2008) to construct the following depen-
dent (binary) variables at the individual level:
• Generalized trust: “How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other
Ugandans?” (question Q84C). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers
either “I trust them somewhat” or “I trust them a lot”. Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
• Ethnic identity: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and
being a _ [R’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?”
(question Q83). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers either “I feel
only (R’s ethnic group)” or “I feel more (R’s ethnic group) than Ugandan”. Otherwise,
the value is set to zero.
In Sect. 5.4, we also consider the following two alternative questions:
• Trust in known people: “How much do you trust each of the following types of people:
Other people you know?” (question Q84B). The variable takes the value one if the
respondent answers either “I trust them somewhat” or “I trust them a lot”. Otherwise, the
value is set to zero.
• Trust in relatives: “How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your
relatives?” (question Q84A). The variable takes the value one if the respondent answers
either “I trust them somewhat” or “I trust them a lot”. Otherwise, the value is set to zero.
12 Afrobarometer selects samples in the following way: “The sample is designed as a representative cross-
section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known
chance of selection for interview. We strive to reach this objective by (a) strictly applying random selection
methods at every stage of sampling and by (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population
size wherever possible (…). The sample is stratified by key social characteristics in the population such as
sub-national area (e.g. region/province) and residential locality (urban or rural)” (Afrobarometer 2008).
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In Sect. 4 we denote our dependent variable by TRUST08 ∈{Generalized trust, Ethnic
identity, Trust in known people, Trust in relatives}. In Sect. 6.2, we run a regression where
the dependent variable is a proxy for the level of economic activity. In particular, we use
satellite nightlight, a county-level measure of the average nighttime light intensity. We con-
structed this measure with the help of ArcGIS, using the geo-referenced county border and
the geo-referenced Satellite Nightlight Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (2010). These data have been used in recent research as a proxy for eco-
nomic activity (see, e.g., Henderson et al. 2012; Hodler and Raschky 2011).
3.2.2 Main explanatory variables
We use four alternative explanatory variables with variation at the county-level (at the district-
level in several specifications), FIGHTING00−08c ∈{All Fighting, Violence Against Civilians,
Battles, Internally Displaced People}. All variables code fighting events taking place between
the last day of the Afrobarometer (2000) survey (on June 26, 2000) and the first day of the
Afrobarometer (2008) survey (on July 27, 2008).
• All Fighting (main explanatory variable): Total amount of all violent events in a county. It
corresponds to the sum of the events of the following “Event Type” in ACLED: “Battle-
Government regains territory”, “Battle-No change of territory”, “Battle-Rebels gain ter-
ritory”, “Riots/Protests”, and “Violence against civilians”.
• Violence Against Civilians: Total number of events coded as “Violence against civilians”
in ACLED.13
• Battles: Total number of events coded as “Battle-Government regains territory”, “Battle-
No change of territory”, and “Battle-Rebels gain territory” in ACLED.
• Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of IDP per district in 2006 from UNHCR
(2006).
As default in most specifications, we focus on the number of events of the three fighting
variables above (All Fighting, Violence Against Civilians, and Battles), we also run as robust-
ness checks the corresponding regressions for these three fighting categories, but focusing
on the number of fatalities taking place in the fighting events of a given category.
In an alternative specification (Sect. 6.1), we use the information provided by ACLED
to match (whenever feasible) each event coded in All fighting to a particular ethnic group
according to the classification of Afrobarometer (2008) (Q79). In this alternative specifica-
tion, All fighting varies on the ethnic group level, and corresponds to the total number of
violent events linked to a group.
3.2.3 Primary control variables
We define as “primary” control variables the ones that have a key role in our identification
strategy, since (as explained below) these allow us to filter out heterogeneity in the pre-
treatment stage. The primary control variables is a vector of trust/identity variables from
Afrobarometer (2000), denoted by TRUST00 = {Generalized trust 2000, Trust in Known
People 2000, Trust in relatives 2000, Ethnic identity 2000}. The variation of TRUST00 is at
the district level.
13 Examples of violence against civilians in the ACLED database for Uganda include e.g. different ethnic
clans attacking each other in cattle raids, rebel ambushes of passenger vehicles, or rebel raids against villages
supposed to support the enemy.
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The questions asked in Afrobarometer (2000) were not identical to those asked in Afro-
barometer (2008). The exact construction of the 2000 variables is deferred to Appendix B.
In Sect. 6.2, the dependent variable is satellite nightlight, and we control for its analogue in
year 2000.
3.2.4 Ethnic control variables
In some tables, we also control for a number of ethnic-specific time-invariant control vari-
ables:
• Slavery is borrowed from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). It measures the number of
people who were enslaved during the slave trade period (1400–1900) in each eth-
nic group, normalized by the area of land inhabited by the group during the nine-
teenth century. This is Nunn and Wantchekon’s preferred measure of slave trade
incidence.
• Hunting indicates the traditional ethnic-specific dependence on hunting (including trap-
ping and fowling). This variable is borrowed from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013)—as are the three variables listed below. It corresponds to variable v2 of the
Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967). The variable is measured on a cardinal scale
between 0 and 9, where a larger number means more dependence (the same scale is used
for the three variables listed below).
• Fishing indicates the traditional ethnic-group specific dependence on fishing (including
shell fishing and the pursuit of large aquatic animals). It corresponds to variable v3 of
the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
• Animal husbandry indicates the traditional ethnic-group specific dependence on animal
husbandry. It corresponds to variable v4 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
• Agriculture indicates the traditional ethnic-group specific dependence on agriculture
(including penetration of the soil, planting, tending the growing crops, and harvesting).
It corresponds to variable v5 of the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
Note that together with the omitted category “Gathering”, the scores of the activities
“Hunting”, “Fishing”, “Animal husbandry” and “Agriculture” sum up to 100 % of the tradi-
tional food dependence.
3.2.5 Other control variables
All regressions include a vector of individual sociodemographic controls (X) from Afro-
barometer (2008), consisting of age, education, employment status, gender, rural/urban loca-
tion, religion and ownership of a radio and of a TV; and a vector of district-level controls (Z)
including population, urbanization rate, demographic structure, share of manufacture, share
of subsistence farming, net migration, fertility, number of micro-enterprises, and unemploy-
ment, all of which are from the Census of the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2002). These
data are not available at the county level. Further, we use the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group
(GREG) dataset, which allows us to compute ethnic fractionalization measures at the county
level (Weidmann et al. 2010). Finally, we proxy for living conditions in 2000 using the
county-level average satellite nightlight intensity, computed based on data from satellites of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010).
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3.3 Empirical strategy
We consider the following benchmark econometric model:
P(TRUST08i,c,e = 1) = 
[
a0 + a1FIGHTING00−08c + TRUST00′d α + ETHNIC′eβ
+X′iγ + Z′cδ
] (1)
where i denotes an individual, c a county (where a county is a sub-unit of a district, d), and
e an ethnic group.
We will estimate (i) Probit maximum likelihood models and (ii) linear probability models
using either the ordinary least squares (OLS) or the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estima-
tor, in presence of instrumental variables. Hence,  in Eq. (1) is either the cdf of a standard
normal distribution (in the Probit model) or the identity function. TRUST08 yields the dif-
ferent measures of trust/identity from Afrobarometer (2008). FIGHTING00−08c is our main
explanatory variable. In the set of tables below, we always report the estimated coefficient
a1 capturing the effect of county-level fighting on trust/identity. In some specifications we
change the scale of analysis by considering FIGHTING00−08d , a measure of fighting at the
district rather than at the county level. We also consider an alternative independent variable,
FATALITIES00−08c , counting the number of casualties (as opposed to the number of fighting
events) for the same categories of violence as for the FIGHTING00−08c variable. FATALI-
TIESc00−08 may be a more precise treatment measure, since it is correlated with the conflict
intensity.
The primary control variables TRUST00d (a vector) is designed to filter out heterogeneity in
the pre-treatment measures of trust at the geographic or ethnic group level. This variable plays
a key role in our identification strategy. Ideally, since our aim is to identify the causal effect
of shocks taking place between the two Afrobarometer surveys, we would like to control
for individual measures of trust in 2000. However, this is not possible since Afrobarome-
ter is not a panel at the individual level. Filtering out the effect of past trust at the district
level, TRUST00d yields the best approximation of this ideal specification. Since part of the
time-invariant heterogeneity may be rooted at the ethnic rather than at the geographical level,
we filter out heterogeneity in long-term trust across ethnic groups by a set of ethnic-specific
control variables ETHNICe. These include Slavery following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
who show that an ethnic history of enslavement has a large and significant explanatory power
on the average level of trust exhibited by people belonging to different ethnic groups in Afro-
barometer 2005. In addition, we control for the traditional ethnic-specific dependence on the
traditional activities of hunting, fishing, animal husbandry and agriculture from Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013), as described above. Finally, in some specifications we include
ethnic fixed effects. In this case, we omit ethnic controls, since these are collinear with the
fixed effects.
We introduce a set of additional individual sociodemographic control variables (Xi ) and
county- (when available) or district-level controls (Zc) to filter out additional sources of
heterogeneity. All district-level controls are from the Census 2002, and therefore are measured
before the outburst of conflict in 2002–2005. This reduces concerns about their endogeneity.
We also control for ethnic fractionalization and for nightlight measured using satellites for
the year 2000 at the county level. We allow for intracluster correlation of the error terms both
in the spatial and ethnic dimensions.
OLS and Probit regressions may yield inconsistent estimates of a1, due to either reverse
causality or omitted variables bias. We address this concern through an instrumental variable
strategy. Concern about reverse causality is mitigated by the fact that our dependent variable
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is measured in 2008, 3 years past the end of active fighting. This is one of the reasons why
we do not focus on Afrobarometer 2005, which surveys Ugandan people while fighting
is either still ongoing or a very recent experience (see Fig. 1). However, reverse causality
cannot be ruled out completely if variables are serially correlated. Perhaps more importantly,
unobservable shocks occurring after year 2000 may be driving both trust and fighting. To
this aim, we instrument FIGHTING00−08c by a county-level geographic characteristic that is
correlated with the fighting intensity, while having, plausibly, no direct effect on trust. We
focus in particular on the Distance to Sudan.14 This is a natural instrument, since Southern
Sudan played a crucial role in the 2002–2005 military escalation. In particular, before 2001
this region used to be a safe haven for rebel movements—most notably for the LRA. However,
the events following September 11 forced the Sudanese government to withdraw its support
of the LRA and to let the Ugandan army attack the LRA bases in Sudanese territory. This
triggered the response of the LRA with repeated incursions, looting and engagements with
the army within the Ugandan territory.15
Our exclusion restriction requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the instrument.
In this respect, it is important to remember that our primary control variables (TRUST00d ),
and the ethnic controls, should filter out the long-run correlation between our instrument
and potential omitted factors. For instance, if counties (or ethnicities) neighboring Sudan
were less inclined to trust and cooperation due to unobserved historical or cultural fac-
tors, these factors might have a direct effect on TRUST08. However, they would also affect
TRUST00d , and as long as their influence did not change after 2000 (other than due to
fighting), the instrument would be uncorrelated with the omitted variables conditional on
the observables—which include TRUST00d . To the opposite, problems would arise if the
error term included time varying shocks that are correlated with the geographical vari-
ables. An example might be a weather shock during the period 2000–2008. However,
we could not find evidence of any such remarkable event. In Sect. 6.1 below, we con-
sider a more demanding identification where we control for ethnic and county-level fixed
effects.
Finally, a possible concern is conflict-induced migration: in 2008, some people may be
living in different counties from where they lived at the time of the conflict when mas-
sive forced population displacements occurred. However, this issue is quantitatively minor.
First, by 2008 the majority of displaced people had returned to their home villages (see
UN 2009; UNHCR 2010). In contrast, the problem would have been important if we had
used Afrobarometer 2005, since the number of people living in refugee camps peaked
at 1.8 millions in 2005. This is one of the main reasons why we rely on Afrobarom-
eter 2008. Second, most movements took place within counties. People were forced to
move from rural areas to so-called “protected villages” established mostly in local trad-
ing centers (UNOCHA 2002; Médecins sans frontiéres 2004). As a result, cross-county
migration is altogether modest. Given that our main explanatory variable is defined at the
county-level, the results are unlikely to be contaminated by cross-county conflict-induced
migration.
14 We construct this variable by computing with ArcGIS the minimum distance between the geo-referenced
border of a given county and the geo-referenced border of Sudan.
15 If we had a longer span of data and a full dynamic model, the instrument would be the interaction between
September 11 and “distance to Sudan”. Note that “distance to Sudan” could have a direct permanent effect
on trust (if, e.g., Acholi people trust the Kampala government less than do people in the rest of Uganda).
However, this effect is filtered out by TRUST00d . See the discussion below.
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Table 1 Effect of fighting on generalized trust in 2008
Dependent variable: generalized trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting −1.97*** −1.06** −0.85* −0.49*** −0.32*** −0.28***
(0.50) (0.52) (0.51) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Fighting variable Events Events Events Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities
Ethnic controls No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2,242 2,131 2,234 2,242 2,131 2,234
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.116 0.146 0.102 0.118 0.148
The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for clustering at county
level). Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All specifications control for unreported
individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion
Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in
Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, AgeDependencyRatio, Share of Manufacture,
Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of MicroEnterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate,
Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization,
Nightlight)
4 Results
Table 1 presents the results of a set of probit estimations. We only report the estimated
marginal effects of the main coefficient of interest, i.e., FIGHTING00−08c in columns (1)–(3),
and FATALITIES00−08c in columns (4)–(6). The regressions in columns (1) and (4) control only
for county (or district) and individual characteristics. The results show a significant negative
effect of fighting on general trust. Controlling for time-invariant ethnic characteristics that can
affect trust reduces the estimated effect from −1.97 to −1.06 in column (2) and from −0.49 to
−0.32 in column (5). Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we control for ethnic fixed effects. This
is a very demanding specification because it identifies exclusively within-ethnicity effects of
conflict, while in reality an important effect of conflict may be to exacerbate ethnic rivalries.
Not surprisingly, the marginal effects are now smaller: ethnic fixed effects absorb about half
of the effects in columns (1) and (4). However, the estimated coefficients remain statistically
significant, at the 10 % level in the case of fighting and at the 1 % level in the case of fatalities.
The effect of our primary control variable, TRUST00d , (coefficients not reported in Table 1)
is interesting. Generalized trust is highly positively correlated with its district-level counter-
part in Afrobarometer (2000) (which is, recall, a component of the vector TRUST00d ): the
regression coefficient of “Generalized trust 2000” ranges between 0.79 and 1.44 across the
different specifications, and is always significant at the 1 % level. Such a high autocorrelation
is reassuring, as it suggests that TRUST00d indeed filters out well the pre-conflict level of
trust.16
16 The coefficient of Slavery in columns (2) and (5) is, as expected, consistently negative: individuals belong-
ing to groups highly exposed to enslavement in the eighteenth century report a lower Generalized trust in 2008,
ceteris paribus. The point estimates range between −0.65 and −0.66, being on the margin of standard levels
of statistical significance (the p-values range between 0.116 and 0.128 across the different specifications).
The fact that the effect of slavery is smaller than in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) is not surprising, since our
regressions control for trust in 2000 which filters out most of the long-term variation. Consistent with this
interpretation, Slavery becomes statistically significant if we omit TRUST00d .
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In summary, the probit regressions show that people living in counties where fighting has
been more intense and has caused a higher number of fatalities turned on average less trustful
towards other Ugandans relative to year 2000. The effect is robust to the inclusion of several
controls and ethnic fixed effects.
Since there are concerns of reverse causality or omitted variables bias (as discussed above),
Table 2 reports the results of an instrumental variable method. We only report the estimated
marginal effects of the main coefficient of interest, i.e., FIGHTING00−08c in Panel A, and
FATALITIES00−08c in Panel B. In columns (1)–(3) of Panel A (Panel B) we report the results
of the same specification as in columns (1)–(3) (columns (4)–(6)) in Table 1, using a OLS
regression. The coefficients of the OLS regressions are similar in magnitude to the corre-
sponding marginal effects of the Probit model. Note that using OLS and 2SLS also allows us
to two-way cluster standard errors at the ethnic group and county level, which we do through-
out the paper for all OLS and 2SLS regressions. Columns (4)–(6) of Panel A (Panel B) run
the same specification as in columns (1)–(3) (columns (4)–(6)) in Table 1, but using a 2SLS
regression. Columns (7)–(8) in Panel A (Panel B) report the results from 2SLS regressions
using different measures of the intensity of fighting (fatalities) as the primary regressors.
Further, in column (9) of Panel A we use IDP as primary regressor (since this regression has
no counterpart with fatalities, Panel B has only eight columns).
The coefficients of All fighting in the 2SLS regressions are negative and significant. The
results are robust to the alternative measures of fighting, including Violence Against Civilians
(column (7) of Panel A) and Battles (column (8) of Panel A). It is also robust to using the same
measures, though it counts the number of fatalities involved as opposed to the number of
events, as shown in Panel B. Finally, in column (9) of Panel A we show that the results are also
robust to replacing the measure of fighting intensity with the number of IDP.17 We interpret
the larger coefficients in the 2SLS specifications with respect to their OLS counterparts as
originating from two related sources. First, the OLS may suffer from an attenuation bias
in the OLS regressions due to measurement error. Second, the OLS coefficient corresponds
to the average effect of the number of fighting events, FIGHTING00−08c . However, trust
and ethnic identity are likely to respond to the intensity of the treatment (violence), which
varies across counties. For instance, the county-level average fatalities per fighting event is
highly negatively correlated with our instrumental variable, distance to Sudan, the correlation
coefficient being−0.29. This observation suggests that even other non-observable dimensions
of violence intensity (such as looting, kidnapping, permanently injured people, etc.) are likely
to be correlated with our geographical instrument. More generally, if each fighting event (even
each fatality) is associated, on average, with more intense violence in counties close to Sudan,
this can explain why the 2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS ones, which are based on
an average effect.18
We also checked for possible selection problems following the procedure suggested by
Altonji et al. (2005) aimed to gauge the amount of selection on unobservable characteristics
based on the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables.19 This allows one
17 We include IDP for two reasons: First, they are a proxy of fighting intensity. Second, forced displacements
can be viewed as a deliberate military strategy in conflict (cf. Esteban et al. 2011). Indeed, some authors see
the protected villages for IDP in Uganda as part of an aggressive military strategy pursued by the Museveni
government to control and oppress the civilian population in the North (Finnström 2008; Dolan 2009).
18 Consistent with this interpretation, the bias of the OLS coefficient is smaller when we measure violence
by the number of fatalities than when we use the number of fighting episodes, see Panel b of Table 2. The
reason is that fatalities is a better (albeit imperfect) measure of the intensity of violence.
19 We run two regressions: one with a restricted set of control variables and one with a full set of controls.
The restricted set of controls consists of the primary controls, TRUST00d and ETHNICe (i.e., we exclude
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to assess how severe the omitted variable bias should be for the effect of fighting to be driven
fully by unobserved characteristics. We find no indication that our results arise, spuriously,
from a selection on unobservables. To the opposite, adding control variables appears to
increase (in absolute value) the size of the estimated coefficient, suggesting that our result
would be strengthened if we could control for more unobservable variables.
4.1 Ethnic identity
To test more directly whether conflicts affect inter-ethnic attitudes, we replace our measure of
trust by Ethnic identity, i.e., the proportion of respondents who identify themselves primarily
with their ethnic affiliation. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4, corresponding to
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The estimated coefficient of interest is always positive and in
most cases highly significant.20 As in the case of Generalized trust, the coefficients in the
2SLS regressions are significantly larger than their OLS counterpart. Violence strengthens
the identification of Ugandans with their own ethnic group.
4.2 First stage regression
Table 5 reports the coefficients of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions
of 2SLS specifications from Table 2. In particular, columns (1)–(5) (columns (6)–(10)) in
Table 5 correspond to the regressions of columns (4)–(8) in Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2;
finally column (11) in Table 5 corresponds to the regression of columns (9) in Panel A of
Table 2. In all cases the IV coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant.
Robust (Kleibergen–Paap) F-statistics accounting for clustered residuals are large, and in
most cases above the conventional threshold for weak instruments. The specifications with
ethnicity fixed effects are generally more problematic, and the F-statistics show in some cases
possible weak instrument problems. This is not surprising, since ethnic groups are spatially
clustered, limiting the explanatory power of the geographical excluded instrument in the
first-stage regression. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the F-statistics are well above ten
when the intensity of fighting is measured by the number of fatalities (columns (6)–(10)).
One should recall here, though, that the standard Stock-Yogo critical values for weak
instruments are calibrated for the case of i.i.d. residuals, and do not apply to the case of
clustered standard errors (see, e.g., Bun and de Haan 2010). Therefore, the F-statistics provide
no precise diagnostic of the weak instrument problem.
Footnote 19 continued
Xi and Zd in Eq. 1)—both are essential constituents of our econometric specification. Then, we calculate
the ratio
∣∣aˆ1
∣∣ /
(∣∣∣aˆ R1
∣
∣∣ − ∣∣aˆ1
∣∣
)
, where aˆ1 is the estimated coefficient with the full set of controls and the
alternative options for ETHNICe (columns 1–3 in Table 2), while aˆ R1 is the estimated coefficient with the
restricted set of controls. In absence of ethnic controls we obtain aˆ R1 = −1.02, implying that
∣
∣∣aˆ R1
∣
∣∣ <
∣∣aˆ1
∣∣
(since aˆ1 = −2.10). With ethnic covariates we get aˆ R1 = −0.73 (aˆ1 = −1.12) and with ethnic fixed effects
aˆ R1 = −0.45 (aˆ1 = −0.94). In none of the three cases is the point estimate attenuated by the inclusion of the
full set of controls. In fact, such inclusion increases the absolute value of the point estimate.
Note that the power of this robustness test depends on the explanatory power of the observable characteristics
that are included. In our case, 17 out of the 34 additional control variables are significant at the 5 % level and
their inclusion increases the R2 by 0.04 (with small variations across the alternative options for ETHNICe).
20 We repeated the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure to detect problems of selection on unobservables. The
restricted regression yields with no ethnic control aˆ R1 = 0.33 (aˆ1 = 0.74 in column (1) of Table 4), with ethnic
covariates aˆ R1 = 0.35 (with aˆ1 = 0.43 in col. 2), and with ethnic fixed effects, aˆ R1 = 0.25 (with aˆ1 = 0.49 in
col. 3). Thus, again, selection on unobservables does not appear to drive our results.
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Table 2 Effect of fighting on generalized trust in 2008 (second stage)
Dependent variable: generalized trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Events
All fighting −2.10*** −1.12* −0.94* −4.34*** −4.08* −4.70**
(0.75) (0.64) (0.53) (1.22) (2.23) (2.27)
Violence civil. −11.37**
(5.53)
Battles −7.70**
(3.83)
IDP −0.87**
(0.38)
Ethnic controls No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2,252 2,141 2,252 2,252 2,141 2,252 2,252 2,252 2,252
R2 0.128 0.145 0.181 0.112 0.125 0.155 0.154 0.155 0.186
Dependent variable: generalized trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: fatalities
All fighting −0.53*** −0.35** −0.32* −0.99*** −0.66* −0.90**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) (0.35) (0.42)
Violence Civil. −1.63**
(0.81)
Battles −1.95**
(0.90)
Ethnic controls No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2,252 2,141 2,252 2,252 2,141 2,252 2,252 2,252
R2 0.128 0.148 0.183 0.118 0.144 0.171 0.172 0.160
The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering
at county and ethnicity level). Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All specifications
control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV,
Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), districts characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past General-
ized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, AgeDependencyRatio,
Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of MicroEnterprises, Adjusted
Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic
Fractionalization, Nightlight)
As additional diagnostics, we follow the procedure suggested by Angrist and Pischke
(2009, pp. 212–213). The results are in Appendix A. Table 10 reports the coefficient of All
fighting in the second stage regression, along with a number of statistics of the first-stage
regressions from a variety of specifications and estimation techniques. Columns (1)–(3)
show the robustness of the benchmark second-stage estimates (columns (4)–(6) in Panel A
of Table 2; columns (1)–(3) in Table 5) to the use of a LIML estimator. This estimator is
less efficient, but also less biased when instruments are weak. The fact that the results are
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Table 3 Effect of fighting on ethnic identity in 2008
Dependent variable: ethnic identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting 0.69* 0.39 0.45* 0.18** 0.14** 0.12**
(0.36) (0.30) (0.27) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Fighting variable Events Events Events Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities
Ethnic controls No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE No Ethnic variables Ethnic FE
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2,256 2,145 2,217 2,256 2,145 2,217
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.072 0.087 0.056 0.072 0.087
The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for clustering at county
level). Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All specifications control for unreported
individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion
Fixed Effects), district characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in
Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of Manufacture,
Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted Total Fertility Rate,
Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization,
Nightlight)
almost identical suggests no bias due to weak instruments. In columns (4)–(6), we run a
reduced-form regression. The coefficient of the excluded instrument has the expected sign
and is statistically significant, which is again reassuring. Finally, in column (7) we report the
results of a specification where we collapse all variables to the county level. We include the
standard set of district and county controls (but drop all individual controls). The results are
similar to the benchmark specification using individual level variables. In this specification,
standard errors are not clustered, allowing us to compute standard Cragg–Donald Wald F-
statistics for i.i.d. residuals which can be compared to the Stock-Yogo bounds. We obtain
F = 17.4. We conclude that our analysis is not subject to a weak instrument problem. In the
two panels of Table 11 in the Appendix we display the analogues of the first-stage results as
in Tables 5 and 10 when the dependent variable is ethnic identity.21
4.3 Exclusion restriction
We run a number of placebo tests on the credibility of our exclusion restriction.
Consider, first, Fig. 3. The first panel displays counties characterized by a positive number
of fighting episodes, while the second panel shows counties in which no fighting occurred.
Each figure plots on the horizontal axis the distance from Sudan, and on the vertical axis
the county-level average of generalized trust filtered by the set of control variables (without
including the large battery of religion and ethnic fixed effects due to the relatively small
number of observations). Remarkably, the relationship is positive and highly significant across
counties experiencing violence, but is insignificant across those experiencing no violence.
Though not a formal test of the validity of our exclusion restriction, this falsification analysis
21 In the Appendix Table 15 we also report the benchmark IV estimates of Generalized trust (Panel A of
Table 2) and Ethnic identity (Panel A of Table 4)—with and without ethnic fixed effects—using IV-Probit,
which leads to very similar results as in Tables 2 and 4.
Finally, our main results also hold when the generalized trust variable is not coded as a binary variable, but
left in its original ordinal scale. In this case, one can use an Ordered Probit estimator. However, the results of
this specification are not robust to the inclusion of ethnic fixed effects.
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Table 4 Effect of fighting on ethnic identity in 2008 (second stage)
Dependent variable: ethnic identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: events
All fighting 0.74** 0.43** 0.49** 2.94*** 4.05*** 4.23***
(0.37) (0.21) (0.22) (1.03) (1.54) (1.29)
Violence civil. 10.26***
(2.52)
Battles 6.93***
(2.39)
IDP 0.79***
(0.19)
Ethnic controls No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2,259 2,148 2,259 2,259 2,148 2,259 2,259 2,259 2,259
R2 0.059 0.076 0.094 0.039 0.036 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.088
Dependent variable: ethnic identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: fatalities
All fighting 0.19** 0.15** 0.12*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.81***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22)
Violence Civil. 1.47***
(0.44)
Battles 1.76***
(0.53)
Ethnic controls No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
No Ethn.
var.
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Ethnic
FE
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2,259 2,148 2,259 2,259 2,148 2,259 2,259 2,259
R2 0.059 0.077 0.094 0.043 0.061 0.071 0.070 0.064
The unit of observation is an individual. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for two-way clustering
at county and ethnicity level). Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All specifications
control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV,
Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed Effects), district characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized
Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio,
Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted
Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic
Fractionalization, Nightlight)
suggests that distance from Sudan has an effect on trust in 2008 only through the channel
of recent violence. In peaceful counties, distance from Sudan is uncorrelated with trust. The
same relationship holds for ethnic identity (see Fig. 4 in the Appendix).
Second, the distance from Sudan could be correlated with pre-conflict levels of trust or
with other characteristics affecting trust. Although we control for district-specific average
levels of trust, one might worry that this filter of the effect of past trust is imperfect. To
address this concern, we run a large number of placebo regressions whose results are shown
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Fig. 3 The scatter plots display the distance from Sudan (horizontal axis), and the county-level average
of generalized trust filtered by the set of control variables (vertical axis). The left panel displays counties
characterized by a positive number of fighting episodes, while the right panel displays counties with no
fighting episodes
in Table 6. In Panel A we start by running individual-level regressions whose dependent vari-
able is the survey measure of generalized trust (columns (1)–(2)) or ethnic identity (columns
(3)–(4)) in 2000. These are regressed on the county specific measure of distance from Sudan.
In all panels we include no control variables in odd columns, while we include the full set
of controls and fixed effects in even columns. From column (5) onwards we show the anal-
ogous placebo regressions for our standard control variables, i.e. the district characteristics
at the beginning of the period (Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises,
Adjusted Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and the county characteristics at the
beginning of the period (Ethnic Fractionalization, Nightlight). The estimated coefficient is in
most cases statistically insignificant, providing reassurance that distance to Sudan does not
capture spurious effects of historical differences in trust or other covariates.
4.4 Quantitative effects
The magnitude of the estimated effects is large.22 The dependent variable, Generalized trust,
has a sample mean equal to 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.46. All fighting ranges between
0 and 227 violent events with a standard deviation of 45 events. In Table 2, an estimated
coefficient of −4.70 in the main 2SLS regression with ethnicity fixed effects (column (6),
Panel A) means that a one-standard-deviation increase in All fighting (i.e., 45 additional
episodes of violence) translates into a 46 % decrease in the standard deviation of Generalized
22 In all the tables, the fighting variables have been rescaled by a factor 103 in order to improve readability
of their estimated coefficients.
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trust (i.e., 22 percentage points). This is a very large effect, at about half the magnitude of the
difference between the Netherlands (0.48), the eighth most trusting country in world, and the
three countries with the lowest trust levels (Peru, Brazil and the Philippines (0.06)).23 The
estimated effect between the least and most conflictive counties is a 107 percentage point
increase in Generalized trust. With the more conservative main OLS estimate (column (3),
Panel A, Table 2) we obtain that a one-standard-deviation increase in All fighting leads to
a 9.2 % standard deviation decrease in generalized trust; the “maximum” effect of moving
from counties with no violence to the county with the highest violence corresponds to a
21 percentage point decrease in trust towards other Ugandans. The quantitative effects are
similar when alternative measures of violence are considered.
In Table 4, an estimated coefficient of 4.23 in the main 2SLS regression with ethnicity fixed
effects (column (6), Panel A) means that a one-standard-deviation increase in All fighting
translates into a 48 % standard deviation increase in ethnic identity (i.e., 19 percentage points).
The estimated effect between the least and most conflictive districts is a 96 percentage point
increase in ethnic identity. With the more conservative OLS estimate (column (3), Panel A,
Table 4) we get that a one-standard-deviation increase in All fighting leads to a 7.1 % standard
deviation increase in ethnic identity. The quantitative effects are similar when alternative
measures of violence are considered.
5 Robustness
In this section we perform some robustness checks. To limit the number of tables, we hone
in on the specification with ethnic fixed effects, the most demanding one. Also, we usually
report only the results of regressions where the intensity of fighting is measured by the count
of events rather than the number of fatalities.
5.1 Cross-district versus cross-county variations
Table 7 reports the results of a subset of the regressions of Tables 2 and 4 when All fighting is
measured at the district rather than at the county level. This specification has the advantage
of measuring the dependent variable at the same level as the lagged dependent variable.
Its disadvantage is that it disposes with some information available in the data (i.e., the
cross-county variation in trust within each district in Afrobarometer 2008). Columns (1)–
(6) of Panel A reproduce the columns (1)–(6) of Panel A of Table 2 on Generalized trust.
All estimated coefficients are negative, and all but one are statistically significant. However,
they are smaller in magnitude (in absolute value) than in the cross-county regression, and
the 2SLS estimate with ethnic fixed effects becomes marginally insignificant. Analogously,
columns (7)–(12) of Panel A reproduce the columns (1)–(6) of Panel B of Table 2, focusing
on fatalities rather than events. The results are very similar.
Panel B analogously reproduces the columns (1)–(6) of both Panels of Table 4 on Ethnic
identity. All coefficients have in this case the expected positive sign, and are all highly
significant.
While the regressions of Panels (a) and (b) retain the variation of the dependent variable
at the individual level, in Panel C all information is collapsed at the district level. For this
23 These figures correspond to the average percentage of respondents answering “Most people can be trusted”
to the World Values Survey Question A165 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. We use the average scores over the first
three waves of the World Values Survey (2009).
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purpose, we exclude individual control variables from the right hand side of equation (1) and
collapse all the other variables (both on the right and on the left hand sides) at their district
average level. The resulting sample consists of only 49 observations (i.e., districts), implying
a low number of degrees of freedom. In columns (1)–(4) we have Generalized trust as the
dependent variable, and display again the results for both events and fatalities. Both the OLS
and the 2SLS coefficients are negative, but only the OLS coefficient is highly significant.
Columns (5)–(8) report the results of the corresponding regressions for Ethnic identity. Here,
all coefficients have the expected positive sign, and are highly significant.
The regressions of Table 7 rule out the cross-county variation. In principle, it is possible
also to run the regressions at the county level including district fixed effects. In this case, the
coefficients are estimated exploiting the within-district variation. This specification is very
demanding, since Uganda has 125 counties and 55 districts. Thus, controlling for district fixed
effects reduces significantly the sources of variation in the data from which the coefficients
of interest are estimated. Moreover, the within-district variation of the instrument is very
limited, since the distance from Sudan of two contiguous counties is often similar, leading
to a severe weak instrument problem. Not surprisingly, the results are often insignificant.
In conclusion, this section shows that our results hinge on cross-district variation, although
the results are stronger when one exploits also the cross-county variation. There is a small
albeit positive contribution of the within-district variation.
5.2 Acholiland
One might suspect that the results above are driven by Acholiland, the troubled region in the
North where most of the fighting between the government and the LRA took place. In fact,
this is not the case. In Appendix Table 12 we focus on the robustness of the benchmark 2SLS
estimates of Generalized trust (Panel A of Table 2) and Ethnic identity (Panel A of Table 4)
when the identifying power of Acholiland is mitigated. Columns (1)–(4) refer to the regression
for Generalized trust. Starting out without ethnic fixed effects, in column (1) we remove the
counties classified as Acholi by the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al. 2010).24 In column (2)
we remove from the sample the counties classified as Acholi by the Ethnologue (ETHN)
definition of Acholiland (Lewis 2009). Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to columns (1)
and (2), but including ethnic fixed effects. In neither case are the results significantly different
from the benchmark specifications of Panel A of Table 2, although with ethnic fixed effects
the standard errors increase, and the significance level is just below the 10 % threshold. In
columns (5)–(8) we perform the corresponding analysis for Ethnic identity. The results are
again robust.
5.3 Additional controls
In Appendix Table 13 we show that the results are robust to the inclusion of additional
controls, namely past fighting events from 1997 to 1999, “trust in president” in 2008, and
insecurity perceived at the individual level during the last year before the 2008 survey. We
explain these variables in detail in the Data Appendix. We do not include these regressors
in our main specifications since (i) past fighting is measured imprecisely as it covers only
3 years, due to data limitations; (ii) trust in president is likely to be endogenous, and could
even be regarded as an outcome variable; (iii) insecurity may suffer from selection-into-
24 In particular, this dummy codes as one all counties where Acholis are the largest ethnic group everywhere
in the territory according to GREG.
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victimization bias and covers only the period 2007–2008. However, we find that our results
are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
5.4 Other dimensions of trust
Finally, Appendix Table 14 replaces the dependent variable of Panel A of Table 2 (in particular,
the specification with ethnic fixed effects of columns (3), (6), (7), (8) and (9)) by Trust in
known people (columns (1)–(5)) and Trust in relatives (columns (6)–(10)), respectively. The
estimates are in all but one case insignificant. Interestingly, there is some evidence in the
2SLS estimates of a positive effect of fighting on trust in relatives, although this is never
statistically significant. This result is partially different from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011),
who find that a past history of enslavement has a negative effect on all dimensions of trust,
including trust in relatives. Our finding suggests that the effect of local ethnic conflicts is less
pervasive and mostly confined to the inter-ethnic dimension.25
The findings that conflict leads to a stronger ethnic identity, and that it has a strong negative
and significant impact on generalized trust, while having only a weak and non-significant
effect on trust in family, are consistent with the theoretical literature on the emergence of
parochialism and within-group bias in the face of inter-group conflict (cf. Bowles and Gintis
2004; Choi and Bowles 2007).
6 Extensions
In this section, we consider two important extensions of the main specification.
6.1 Spatial–ethnic variation in violence
So far the analysis has shown that violence across Ugandan counties is associated with a
decrease in trust towards other Ugandans and an increase in ethnic identity. In this section,
we propose complementary empirical strategies to address two related issues. First, we would
like to cast more light on the mechanism linking violence to the erosion of trust. The evidence
we present could be driven by the effects of inter-ethnic violence on trust and ethnic identity,
or simply by the mere exposure of people to conflict and violence, regardless of any ethnic
dimension. Our theoretical research in Rohner et al. (2013) links, more specifically, the effect
of war on social capital to inter-ethnic relationships. According to this view, people’s beliefs
should respond to violence targeting their own ethnic group rather than to generic violence
occurring within their own county. We would like to test whether there is more direct evidence
of the ethnic channel. Second, the cross-county identification is subject to the caveat that
counties may have been subject to unobservable shocks correlated with both a high incidence
of conflict and low trust. For example, during the period under consideration the government
might have reduced transfers or public goods to districts (or counties) populated by hostile
ethnic groups. Unfortunately, no direct measure of such government policies are available to
us.
25 We also find that “Trust in known people” is more negatively affected in ethnically diverse areas. In
particular, in OLS regressions we find that, when we split the sample, in low-fractionalization counties the
relationship between trust and fighting is insignificant, whereas in highly fractionalized areas it is negative and
highly significant. This is consistent with a large proportion of known people being from other ethnic groups
in fractionalized areas. However, these results are not robust to TSLS where, due to very large standard errors,
the differences between high- and low-fractionalization areas are insignificant. Since these results (which are
available upon request) are not robust, we do not emphasize them.
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Table 8 Ethnic Fighting, Generalized Trust and Ethnic Identity
Dep. var.: Generalized Trust Ethnic Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fight(OtherEth,Cou) −1.07 −0.21
(0.68) (0.56)
Fight(Eth,Cou) −0.71 0.78***
(0.75) (0.27)
Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou) −0.31 1.83**
(0.67) (0.89)
Fight(Eth)*Radio −0.08** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03)
Fixed Effects Ethnic County, ethnic County*ethnic Ethnic County, ethnic County*ethnic
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Observations 2234 2341 2162 2217 2280 2136
R2 0.146 0.204 0.155 0.087 0.118 0.107
The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level).
Significance levels * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual
sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV, Own Radio, 17 Religion Fixed
Effects), and columns (1) and (4) for district characteristics at the beginning of the period (Past Generalized
Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urbanization, Age-Dependency-Ratio,
Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming, Net Migration, Number of Micro-Enterprises, Adjusted
Total Fertility Rate, Unemployment Rate), and county characteristics at the beginning of the period (Ethnic
Fractionalization, Nightlight)
To make progress in this direction, we exploit spatial×ethnic variations in violence. We
use the information provided by ACLED about the nature of each episode of conflict event,
each being classified as involving specific rebel groups or ethnic militias, civilians, or the
Ugandan army. Many rebel groups have a main ethnic affiliation, e.g. if the ACLED data
lists a “battle” between “Bafumbira Ethnic Militia” and “Batooro Ethnic Militia”, this event
would be linked to both the Bafumbira and the Batooro ethnic groups, and, for example,
episodes involving the LRA can be linked to the Acholi group. Therefore, we can associate
most events with one or more ethnic groups involved, as well as with the counties where they
occurred.26 Having constructed such a variable, we identify the effect of violence on trust and
ethnic identity out of the within-county variation in the number of events involving different
ethnic groups, possibly after controlling for both county and ethnic group fixed effects.
To begin with, column (1) and column (4) of Table 8 yield the results of the Probit spec-
ification of Column (3) in Tables 1 and 3 after splitting the main independent variable All
Fighting at the county-level into events involving (i.e. Fight(Eth,Cou)) and not involving (i.e.
Fight(OtherEth,Cou)) the respondent’s ethnic group. In column (1) both estimated coeffi-
cients are insignificant. Interestingly, in column (4) the coefficient of Fight(EthCou) (0.78)
is positive and highly significant while the coefficient of Fight(OtherEth,Cou) is negative
and insignificant. This regression shows that fighting episodes linked to a respondent’s own
26 We have followed a conservative matching strategy, only linking events that can be attributed with a very
high confidence to particular groups. The results are similar when a more aggressive matching strategy is
used, or when particular rebel groups are removed. The matching table is available from the authors upon
publication.
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ethnic group have a stronger effect on Ethnic identity than do events involving other ethnic
groups.
We consider, next, a specification including both county and ethnic fixed effects, where
the effect of violence is identified by the interaction between the number of fighting events in
the respondent’s county and the number of fighting events throughout Uganda involving the
respondent’s ethnic group: Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou). The hypothesis we test is that, within each
ethnic group, ethnic identity (trust) is stronger (weaker) in counties that are subject to more
intense fighting. Or identically: within each county, ethnic identity (trust) is stronger (weaker)
among people belonging to ethnic groups more actively involved in fighting nationwide.27
The results are presented in columns (2) for Generalized trust and (5) for Ethnic identity.
The point estimates of the interaction effects are, as expected, negative (−0.31) and positive
(1.83), respectively, although only the coefficient in the regression for Ethnic identity is
statistically significant (at the 5 % level).
In the main specification of the previous section, we focused on the effects of violence
that occurred in the respondent’s county. This is a plausible assumption, since our All fighting
variable codes even minor episodes about which knowledge is unlikely to be shared by all
Ugandans. However, well-informed individuals may be affected by news of ethnic violence
involving their group anywhere in Uganda. To test this hypothesis, we include an interaction
between the ownership of a radio and the number of fighting events nationwide involving
the respondent’s group (Fight(Eth)*Radio). This interaction enables us to run an even more
demanding specification controlling for the interaction between ethnic and county fixed
effects. The results are shown in n columns (3) and (6). As expected, the coefficient of
Fight(Eth)*Radio is negative and significant in the case of Generalized trust, and positive
and significant in the case of Ethnic identity. People owning a radio are more reactive to
the news of violence involving their own ethnic group anywhere in Uganda. This result is
related to the growing literature on the politico-economic effects of mass media pioneered
by Strömberg (2004). Recent applications to ethnic conflict include DellaVigna et al. (2011),
and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012), focusing respectively on partisan radio broadcasting in the
Serbo-Croatian and Rwandan conflicts. These papers show that an exogenous increase in the
exposure to radical news affects attitudes towards ongoing conflicts. Note, though, that we
do not try to identify exogenous variation in the exposure to radio broadcasting. Thus, the
effect identified by our regression could reflect, in part, some self-selection of individuals in
the decision to own a radio.
In conclusion, this extension shows that the ethnic channel plays an important role. The
within-county results rule out that the increase in ethnic identity is driven by targeted gov-
ernment policies, e.g., the government spending less on hostile districts or counties.
6.2 The heterogeneous effects of conflict on economic activity
In this extension, we study the effect of violence on economic performance. The ideal depen-
dent variable would be GDP per capita at the county (or district) level, but these data are
not available in Uganda. Therefore, we proxy GDP by light intensity nighttime according to
Satellite Nightlight Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010).
27 The main effects of Fight(Eth) and Fight(Cou) are now absorbed by the county and ethnic fixed effects
and cannot be estimated separately. If we omit the fixed effects, the estimated coefficients of Fight(Eth) and
Fight(Cou) are negative and significant at the 95 % level (−1.27, s.e. 0.50, and −0.12, s.e. 0.06, respectively) in
the case of general trust, and positive but insignificant (0.55, s.e. 0.34, and 0.03, s.e. 0.04) in the case of ethnic
identity. If one adds the interaction term Fight(Eth)*Fight(Cou) to this specification without fixed effects, the
estimated main effects Fight(Eth) and Fight(Cou) remain negative and significant (positive and insignificant)
for the case of general trust (ethnic identity), while the interaction coefficient is in both cases insignificant.
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Nightlight data have been used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity (see, for
example Henderson et al. 2012; Hodler and Raschky 2011). We include the details of the
data construction are in the Appendix.
The focal point of our analysis is the extent to which post-conflict recovery is heteroge-
neous across counties of different ethnic fractionalization. In particular we hypothesize that
if conflict destroys trust and forges strong ethnic identities, the more fractionalized counties
would suffer stronger and more persistent economic effects because of their heavier reliance
on inter-ethnic business relations that are disrupted by the erosion of trust.
Since satellite nightlight, the dependent variable, is measured at the county level we cannot
condition on any individual-level information.28 We estimate the following specification
NIGHTLIGHT08c = α0 + α1NIGHTLIGHT00c + α2FIGHTING00−08c
+α3 F R ACc + α4FIGHTING00−08c × FRACc + uc. (2)
We use a Tobit regressor rather than an OLS, since satellite light data are censored at zero.
In all specifications, the main coefficient of interest is α4.
The results are reported in Table 9. Column (1) shows that the main effect of All fighting
on satellite light in 2008 is negative, but statistically insignificant. Column (2) shows that
there is a negative and significant interaction effect: Fighting affects Satellite light negatively
in highly ethnically fractionalized counties. Since the main effects are measured at a zero
level of fractionalization, the insignificant coefficient on All fighting indicates that violence
has no economic effect in non-fractionalized counties.
As usual, it is difficult to instrument the interaction term. To make progress in this direction,
we follow Besley and Persson (2011) and split the sample into high- and low-fractionalization
counties, instrumenting in each specification All fighting with the same geographic charac-
teristics as before. Since 47 % of the counties have zero fractionalization, and 75 % have a
measure of fractionalization below 23 %, we set the threshold at the top quartile. Thus, the
sample of low-fractionalization (high-fractionalization) counties consists of the three lowest
quartiles (respectively, top quartile). The coefficients of interest are now the main effects of
All fighting, separately for low- and high-fractionalization counties, in columns (3)–(4) of
Table 9, respectively. Fighting is associated with a large and significant decline in living con-
ditions in high-fractionalization counties (column (4)), and with no significant effect in less
fractionalized counties (column (3)).29 The coefficient of All fighting in high-fractionalization
counties is more than thirteen times larger. In the last three columns of Table 9 we show that
the results are similar for alternative measures of fighting.30
The finding that ethnic violence dating back to 2002–2005 has a negative effect on eco-
nomic outcomes measured in 2008 in ethnically fractionalized counties, is consistent with the
view that conflict hinders economic cooperation in ethnically divided societies. The evidence
suggests that violence has weaker effects on economic cooperation when violence does not
involve ethnic cleavages. In other words, violence appears to have more persistent effects in
ethnically divided areas.
In the working paper version of this study (Rohner et al. 2012), we show the results
of regressions using an alternative proxy of living standards as the dependent variable. In
28 Note that in this regression we cannot control for ethnic fixed effects, since the dependent variable is
measured at the county level.
29 The small sample size in the split sample reduces the power of the first-stage regression. The Kleibergen–
Paap F-stats are well below 10, raising a concern of a weak-instrument bias.
30 The results are very similar if one controls for the district-averages of our past trust and ethnic identity
variables from the 2000 Afrobarometer survey.
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particular, we use individual responses to a question contained in Afrobarometer (2008) about
perceived living conditions. As we note in that version, the main limitation of this alternative
proxy is its subjective nature. It may easily be biased by non-economic determinants of well-
being, including the state of inter-ethnic relationships within local communities. The results
we obtained with the alternative proxy line up with those outlined here.31
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effect of civil conflict on social capital, focusing on the
experience of Uganda during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we doc-
ument causal effects of an outburst of civil conflict in 2002–2005, driven by an exogenous
shock linked to US foreign policy, on post-conflict trust and ethnic identity. We find that the
extent of fighting has a strong and statistically significant negative impact on Trust towards
other Ugandans between 2000 and 2008. The estimated effect is quantitatively large and
robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of violence and different sta-
tistical techniques. People living in districts experiencing more violence also report a strong
increase in Ethnic identity, i.e., they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic
group relative to alternative affiliations. Thus, conflict appears to strengthen within-ethnic
group ties. This finding is consistent with the evidence in other studies that social capital is
fueled by external wars: countries acquire a stronger internal cohesion.
Our results are robust to various specifications, including instrumental variable strategy.
Further, the findings overall all robust to a demanding identification strategy relying on the
variation within each district in the ethnic violence involving different ethnic groups.
We also study post-conflict economic recovery. Four years after the end of the major con-
flict, the intensity of fighting had negative economic effects in highly fractionalized counties,
but no effects in lowly fractionalized counties. This observation is suggestive of a negative
effect of ethnic conflict on inter-ethnic economic cooperation, and is consistent with the
predictions of our companion paper (Rohner et al. 2013).
In future work, we plan to extend the approach in this paper to the study of civil conflicts
in other African countries, and to consider the role of alliance networks between combatant
groups.
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